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Experiences of Joined-Up Security, Defence and Intelligence Policies: Drawing Lessons from Multi-Layer Governance Systems

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ENVISIONING A NEW
GOVERNANCE ARCHITECTURE
FOR A GLOBAL EUROPE



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Executive Summary

This working paper examines cases of non-EU countries with complex governance structures that, like the European Union, have difficulties coordinating their joined-up policies in the areas of security, intelligence and defence. Its first part discusses the challenges of joined-up action for the European Union's external action, with a focus on coherence. The second part analyses cases of policy responses in Brazil, the United States and Turkey. It describes and discusses how these countries' governments deal with coordination and implementation problems in the areas of migration management (Brazil and Turkey) and artificial intelligence (United States). Each case study sheds light on the country's specific policy challenges, the strategies used to address these issues, and the possible lessons learned. The third part summarises the main takeaways from each case study and reflects on their adaptability to the EU's external action. Lessons can be drawn from Brazil's Operation Acolhida as a civil-military and inter-ministerial initiative to tackle a high migratory influx, from the creation of the United States' Joint Artificial Intelligence Center and the country's mainstreaming of artificial intelligence in security and defence areas, and from Turkey's continuous learning process in migration policies and the establishment of the country's Migration Board. In conclusion, the paper argues that solutions to inter-agency coordination and coherence problems can be found without large institutional or treaty changes and that policy recommendations should consider innovative solutions to improve European Union joined-up external action.

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1 Introduction

The European Union (EU), with its complex governance structure of shared competences and of multiple institutions, with co-existing supranational and intergovernmental features and within a fast-changing geopolitical environment, faces challenges of coherence, sustainability and effectiveness in its external action. These tensions are amplified in areas where there is a stronger linkage between external action and traditionally internal policy fields. This working paper looks at the experience of third countries (i.e. non-EU Member States) that, with complex governance structures, also face challenges of coherence, sustainability and effectiveness in their joined-up actions. As such, it seeks to draw lessons from third countries experiences of joined-up action in the fields relating to security, intelligence and defence. In doing so, it answers task 2.4 of the ENGAGE project, namely “analysing third countries’ foreign policies for comparative perspectives”.

Based on EU primary documents and on a literature review, the first part details the challenges linked to joined-up action for the external action of the European Union, with a focus on coherence as the most pressing issue. The second part brings the analysis of three cases in the policymaking of third countries. The countries of Brazil, the United States (US) and Turkey were chosen to offer variation in terms of geographical position and governance systems. The sampling of these three countries with very different realities and policies allows for an in-depth and wide-angle view of joined-up actions. All three countries present complex governance structures that are related to their geographical size and diversity, their number of government agencies and programmes, historical and present-day civil-military relations and multilevel federal systems in the cases of Brazil and the US. For each country, researchers looked deeper into particular moments, in recent years, when challenges associated with joint action were prominent. In the case of Brazil and Turkey, the sections analyse the countries’ border management and their responses to refugee crises originating in Venezuela and Syria, respectively. Each of the two cases reflects on the particular role of the countries’ military in conjunction with other government agencies. The case of the United States focuses on technical sovereignty and the internal-external nexus shaped by the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, itself a focal agency. Beyond secondary literature and primary sources, each of the cases studies also relies on informal conversations and interviews with experts and practitioners in the field.

Each of the specific cases briefly introduce the policy issues and then shed light on (a) how third countries, with complex governance structures, implement joined-up actions by multiple state and non-state actors, often with an internal-external nexus in security; (b) what are the challenges faced by the selected country in regards to the joined-up action; (c) the countries’ specific strategies, units or frameworks to address these challenges and promote coherence; and (d) what are the possible lessons for joined-up action. Finally, the third part brings together the main lessons from each case study and reflects critically on the adaptability of such lessons to EU external action.



2 The Challenges of Joined-Up Action in the European Union External Action

The European Union through its Global Strategy (2016) pledged to adopt a more joined-up approach in its external action. In other words, the EU has set itself an objective to pursue more coherence and better integrate its diverse forms of external relations, e.g. foreign policy and sectoral cooperation (Veuthey, 2022). HR/VP Josep Borrell in a speech in front of the EEAS (2022) was straight forward in identifying a persistent challenge to EU external action— "working in silos." When there is a lack of horizontal coherence, with responsible institutions and policy areas working "in own logic and own rhythm" and there is a continued "nationalisation of policies in the Council," while EU's strategic documents call for an ambitious joined up, effective, coherent and sustainable EU action, the expectations-capability gap further widens.

Furnes and Ganzle (2016) discuss that the attempt for joined up action of the EU has been associated with an afflict of coherence problems. In [ENGAGE Working Paper 3](#), Sus et al. (2021) define coherence of EU external action in two dimensions:

"Horizontal coherence between different policies of the Union, their objectives and their implementation: the EU's capacity to coordinate and manage policies and institutions that are involved in the pursuit of Union's external objectives. And Vertical coherence between the EU and the Member States: The EU's capacity to work together with Member States on the pursuit of external objectives and to coordinate between the foreign policies of the Member States and the foreign policy of the EU." (p. 13)

Different areas have been managed by actors with very different mandates and goals. In certain policy areas, for instance development policy, the Commission and Member States have parallel, often overlapping policy frameworks, which are not coherent with other aspects of foreign and security policy resulting in vertical incoherence (Furnes & Ganzle, 2016). Horizontal incoherence can be observed for instance in the area of freedom, security and justice (FSJ) and CFSP referring to problems such as fight against terrorism, which needs to be tackled through a combination of EU's policies and instruments (Bonvicini & Comelli, 2009).

[ENGAGE Working Paper 17](#) pays special attention to the factors that obstruct or facilitate the various links among EU policies with external and internal dimensions, with focus on trade, development aid and humanitarian aid (Christou et al., 2022). It supports Furnes and Ganzle's (2016) conclusion that there are internal and external factors that more often than not challenge the coherence (be it horizontal or vertical). Some factors that were identified by Christou et al. (2022) in [ENGAGE Working Paper 17](#) include conflicting policy areas objectives and fragmented legal framework, divergent institutional modus operandi, varying interests (between EU and MS), legal competences complications and politicisation.



One of the objectives to enhance the coherence has been the attempt to improve the collective action. With the introduction of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, the EU has come up with a new policy-level innovation including “comprehensive and joined-up approaches linking EU instruments and actors, especially the Commission and the new European External Action Service” (Furnes & Ganzle 2016, p. 475). While the key aspects of EU foreign and security policy did become more coherent in the comprehensive approach (i.e. reducing compartmentalisation, increased level of convergence at strategic level), the decision-making processes remain still incoherent (unclear and overlapping mandates, misalignment between different organisational cultures namely EEAS and the Commission).

[ENGAGE Working Paper 6](#) adds to the discussion arguing that despite the improvements made through the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in making the Union a more coherent foreign policy actor, the fragmentation of EU treaties concerning external relations still poses an obstacle to better coherence (Szép & Wessel, 2021). This shortcoming affects all internal policies which have an external dimension, such as energy, environment and transport policy, which may lack horizontal coherence due to their exclusion from Part V of the TFEU. Similarly, Hertog and Stroß (2013) argue that the lack of a joint legal basis between CFSP and other Union policies can lead to incoherence as the two policy areas are “artificially split”. Although the mutual non-affectation clause (Article 40 TEU) is seen by some as an opportunity for stronger Union coherence, the division between CFSP and non-CFSP competences and procedures remains, which may pose issues of coherence in policy areas which are not as clear-cut between CFSP and non-CFSP.

Alcaro (2021) agrees with the fragmentation of policymaking in the EU’s external action as being an ingredient for incoherence, as different institutions and bodies are endowed with different responsibilities, in varying degrees of authority according to the specific policy sphere. Further, Furness and Gänzle (2016) identify the nexus between security and development policies as the one with the most coherence problems, noting the presence of parallel, overlapping or competing policies between both institutions and EU Member States (so, both on the horizontal and vertical level). Similarly, Carbone (2009) highlights the issues of coherence which can arise between development policy and the direct or indirect impact of supranational policies in the EU, which include trade, agriculture, fisheries, transport and energy. Despite the Commission’s efforts to integrate coherence in its development policy through, for example, the “crystallisation of policy coherence” into development policy, he argues that achieving coherence in the Commission is easier than in the Council, as in the Council the majority of decisions are agreed by Working Groups, “in which the sectoral logic prevails”, thus posing issues of coherence (Carbone, 2009, pp. 11–13).

Debuysere and Blockmans (2019) argue that horizontal coordination may also lack in certain policy areas of the EU’s external action, as for example the policy coordination unit within the Secretariat General of the Commission is not always involved in discussions between the Commission’s DGs and the EEAS. In a similar vein, they also note that “inter-institutional coordination in the realm of mediation is not well institutionalised” (p. 27), despite the growing involvement of the European Parliament in mediation activities.



Alcaro et al. (2022) adds to the discussion by pointing out to the issues which may arise with “the management of the multiple dimensions of crises and conflicts”, which may require “diverging sectoral logics” and thus negatively affect horizontal coherence (p. 23). An example would be the policies which are required to effectively tackle crises and conflicts which may well conflict with border control policies. Additionally, he also notes the lack of EU resources (financial, operational and human) needed to enhance cooperation in security and defence, which may undermine vertical coherence of EU policymaking as CFSP instruments depend on national contributions and thus on national agendas rather than on a common strategic culture (Alcaro et al., 2022).

Lack of coherence in the external action of the EU influences the Union’s effectiveness (ability to act) and the sustainability of its action. The literature points at two dimensions of coherence: horizontal and vertical. As defined by Sus et al. (2021, [ENGAGE Working Paper 3](#)), vertical coherence is rather specific in the case of the EU and there is no directly comparable dimension when looking at foreign policy of nation-states. Thus, in our paper we focus on horizontal coherence.

Horizontal incoherence between policies, internal and external and between institutions continues to exist, solidifying “working in silos.” As such, the identified challenges include:

- fragmentation in the legal base that creates artificial divisions (Christou et al., 2022),
- contradicting policy objectives, like the case between foreign and security policy and humanitarian aid policy (Christou et al., 2022),
- lack of or insufficient communication between different units and institutions, for example the involvement in discussions between DGs, EEAS and the policy coordination unit within the Secretariat General of the Commission mismatch in degree of responsibilities and authority among various institutional bodies in the same policy area (Debuysere & Blockmans, 2019)

The case studies below will look at how third countries address these and other challenges of joined-up action and what lessons can be learned from their experience.



3 Third Countries' Foreign Policies and the Challenges of Joined-Up Action

Taking into account the challenges associated with joined-up action, this second part delves into particular cases of third countries. For each country with a complex governance structure – Brazil, Turkey and the United States – this working paper analyses a relevant case of joined-up action with links to the broad field of security that also sheds light on internal-external nexus in the security field. This internal-external nexus refers to the relationship and interdependence between internal and external security. In practice, it leads recognition that security policies, and external action more broadly, cut across political borders and division of labour amongst policy areas or agencies. Such recognition is crucial to the European Union, its Members States and third countries alike.

3.1 Brazil's Border Management: Operation Acolhida

3.1.1 The Venezuelan Migrant Crisis in the State of Roraima

Due to political and economic turmoil, between 2016 and November 2019, more than 4.6 million people have left Venezuela in search of a better future (Hidalgo & Carella, 2021; UNCHR, 2018). The Latin American region faced a large exodus of Venezuelans, notably southern American states such as Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru (Cobb & Rawlins, 2014). The heavy influx of refugees in unprepared and bordering Latin American states, such as Roraima in Brazil, generated a social and economic crisis.

As of December 2018, 83,893 Venezuelans had applied for refugee status in Brazil, representing nearly 10% of the population in the receiving Brazilian state of Roraima, a geographically isolated state with low population density and limited economic opportunities, which borders southern Venezuela (UNHCR, 2018). The Brazilian states of Amazonas and Roraima are the main gateway for refugees, as the transit is facilitated by the highway connecting Caracas to Manaus in the Amazon (Cerávolo & Franchi, 2020). Additionally, the low population density in Roraima and in the Venezuelan states of Bolívar and Amazonas means that there are few well-structured urban centres in the bordering region. Thus, local providers of basic social services with limited capacity were pressured by higher and unexpected inflows of requests, as it happened in 2016 with the migration boom of Venezuelan migrants and refugees arriving at the border. The state of Roraima was deeply affected by the flow of migrants, as the isolated state was already depleted of basic social services and infrastructure, such as health and education (Hidalgo & Carella, 2021).

Up until 2016, the ordering of entry and exit of the Brazilian-Venezuelan border was organised by the Brazilian Federal Police. However, with the intensification of the migratory flux, the staff in place were overwhelmed and incapable to deal with the demand. In late 2016, during the first “boom” in migration flow, the state of Roraima found itself forced to declare a state of public health emergency. The unexpected high influx of migrants led to an exceeding number



of hospitalisations which lowered the capacity of hospitals and health clinics (Roraima, 2016). At the time, there were only a few poorly organised shelters operating with the support of nongovernmental organisations, religious institutions and civil society initiatives, supplementing efforts by the state and municipal governments. Consequently, many unassisted migrants started to recur to begging on the streets and prostitution, which led to the generalised fear of rise in crime rates and domestic unrest. The situation had been further complicated by the arrival of the Warao people into Brazil, a protected indigenous group in Venezuela. The first records of their arrival in Brazil date back to 2014. As of 2016, the number had grown to several hundred people assigned to shelters in the towns of Pacaraima, Boa Vista and Manaus. Consequently, this led to the rise in tensions with groups of indigenous people already within Brazil as the Warao are recognised as an indigenous culture, but do not enjoy the same rights set forth in the Brazilian Constitution (Yamada et al., 2018).

3.1.2 Operation Acolhida: A Joined-Up Action

Faced with the overwhelming situation in Roraima, in particular in the city of Pacaraima, the Brazilian federal government sought to organise a multi-level, interagency and joined-up action to systematically address the migrant influx. The logistical humanitarian task force, commonly referred to as Operation *Acolhida* (Welcome), had the goal of structuring cooperation between the federal, state and municipal governments to provide emergency assistance to the Venezuelan migrants and refugees. The main coordination centre presented its intention of working in synergy with governmental, international and non-governmental actors in the preparation in actions of humanitarian assistance and interiorisation, the process of voluntary relocation of migrants and refugees to other parts of the country, where they can be welcomed and assisted with their socio-economic integration in Brazilian society. In order to do so, the operation involved not only the armed forces of 4 countries (Brazil, USA, Colombia and Peru) along with other 23 observing countries, but also more than a 100 agencies and multiple federal, state and municipal authorities. Additionally, it also counted with the participation of multilateral organisations (UNCHR, UNFPA, UNICEF, OIM) and non-governmental organisations and religious and philanthropic entities. The operation's focus was humanitarian action, such as the placement of a logistical system to support civilians and the military in remote regions, unassisted and with a lack of infrastructure.

The planning of operation Acolhida had three main axes: (1) the organisation of the border; (2) sheltering; and (3) the process of interiorisation. The organisational structure of the operation for axes 1 and 2 can be seen in further detail in table 1 below.



Table 1: Operation Acolhida

Facility	Objective	Unities	Activities
Reception and Identification Centre	Identifying the reasons for entering Brazilian territory (tourism, temporary, residence or asylum)	Brazilian Armed Forces Federal Police Health Surveillance Agency (ANVISA) United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) International Organisation for Migration (IOM)	Reception and orientation of citizens wishing to cross the border. Identification and entry checks (Federal Police) Checking immunisation status
Screening Centre	Registration, luggage inspection, issuing working papers.	Brazilian Armed Forces Federal Police Federal Revenue ACNUR IOM Ministry of Health Ministry of Social Development Ministry of Human Rights United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	Collecting biometric data of immigrants requesting temporary residence and asylum seekers. Luggage inspection Regularisation of migration status Provision of documents Phytosanitary inspection Immunisation Social assistance Protection of rights Activities with children
Forward to Medical Post	Emergency and health care of isolated cases of low and medium complexity	Brazilian Armed Forces: medical assistance team	Health screening

Source: own elaboration

Concerning the first axis of the operation, the reception of the migrants counted with the Federal Police, the Federal Public Defenders (DPU), the armed forces, the UNCHR and OIM, as well as the Ministry of health and ANVISA (Health Surveillance Agency). The Federal Police and the DPU were responsible for collecting the biometric data of the individuals and regularizing their legal situation when entering Brazil. The international agencies, such as UNCHR and OIM were responsible for aiding the migrants in the filling out of the necessary forms and information about their legal situation. In addition, the Brazilian Ministry of health and ANVISA were responsible for the voluntary immunisation and emission of vaccine certificates of incoming migrants, which was a task in articulation with the Brazilian armed forces as well.



In a second moment – sheltering – migrants were conducted to the triage post, which counted with the participation of multiple agencies, ministries and multilevel authorities. Beyond securing the continuation of their legal regularisation process, social assistance was also provided. Agencies such as UNICEF and the NGO Visão Mundial aimed at creating of a friendly environment for children; UNFPA and the Brazilian Ministry of Women, Family and Human Rights assisted the most vulnerable population (such as pregnant women, sick people, victims of gender and domestic violence and LGBTQ+ community); and the Ministry of Citizenship and the Ministry of Social Development provided for social assistance in cases of greater risk of vulnerability.

In a third moment, the migrants were conducted to shelters provided by international and national organisations and were accompanied through the interiorisation process which sought to integrate the Venezuelan migrants in the Brazilian society. The interiorisation task force had the mission of creating the necessary conditions to integrate the refugees to other states and Brazilian cities, by way of profile selection. The strategy is divided in four steps: (1) the preparation of the refugees and migrants for relocation; (2) the relocation to other states; (3) the sheltering of the refugees and migrants in the cities of destination; and (4) the promotion of the necessary conditions for their socioeconomic inclusion in the Brazilian society. The process involves directly the Civil House of the Presidency, the Ministry of Citizenship, the Defence Ministry, the Justice and Public Security Ministry, the Economy Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, the government of the State of Roraima, the UNCHR, OIM, state governments and municipal receptors of migrants from the civil society. This axis was the most demanding and complex as it required high level of successful coordination from many spheres of the social life, which counted with the orientation of several ministries. For example, regarding the job market, the Ministries of Economy and Citizenship were involved in making sure that the migrants work situation was not only regularised as well as ensuring the protection of the workers' rights, but also to aid in their social integration.

In practice, decision-making of Operation Acolhida is centred at the Inter-ministerial Committee. The Committee assembles different Federal level Ministries and is headed by the Civil House of the Presidency, itself led by the Brazilian equivalent of the President's Chief of Staff. This ad-hoc body meets regularly to specifically discuss the operation, coordinate various agencies and take the key decisions. At the beginning of the operation, it counted with the participation of high-ranking officials, including ministers themselves. Operationalisation of the decision is taken by the staff of various Ministries and agencies, but also the armed forces. The Brazilian Army, in particular, is tasked with the logistical support. Contrarily to the case of most civil servants in ministries, the armed forces can relocate personnel to different regions of the country for longer periods of time and, as such, are more mobile in the short term.

Finally, Operation Acolhida also relied on the articulation with the international community to assist with the management of this migrant crisis in Roraima. To this extent the Brazilian Foreign Ministry simultaneously conducted several information sessions at its embassies abroad. It also played a fundamental role in the drawing up of the Quito Declaration to the



freedom of mobility of Venezuelan citizens between the thirteen Quito Process countries. Furthermore, international cooperation had a significant impact in the coordination with the World Food Program and UNCHR for the elaboration of assistance to the Venezuelan indigenous population, in particular the Warao people. In this sense, the Ministry of Women, Family and Human Rights, in articulation with the National Indigenous People Foundation, provided for qualified assistance.

3.1.3 The Main Challenges and Benefits of the Joined-Up Action of Operation Acolhida

Six years after the beginning of the operation, many experts and international organisations draw their conclusions on what were the main benefits of the operation and the main challenges faced. Operation Acolhida is considered amongst many experts in refugee crisis and joined-up action as a positive example on how to successfully deal with such a demanding influx of incoming migrants. Nonetheless, a recent report from UNCHR (2022) highlighted the main criticism pointed out by experts, civil society and the institutional organisations along with the migrants themselves to the operation. The interiorisation process was the most demanding and complex axis of the entire operation, requiring high-level coordination with multiple levels of governance. Hence, there were significant points raised about how the local authorities receiving migrants from Pacaraima and Roraima often felt overwhelmed and disoriented as to what were their responsibilities. In this sense, many migrants that were relocated in another state were often misinformed about where they were, the existing support networks and how to cope with specific individual and/or family requests that have a direct impact on the post-interiorisation. As such, the process of interiorisation (the third axis of the operation) saw the need of an increased coordination and communication amongst different ministries and authority levels.

The criticism stemming from the lack of organisation in the interiorisation process was a transversal point which resulted from the lack of institutional dialogue in the planning and coordination between the organisations involved during 2019 onwards, during President Jair Bolsonaro's term. In this period, there was a policy of militarisation of Operation Acolhida and the Civil House of the Presidency itself, which was responsible for the coordination of the task force. Therefore, meetings between all actors and continuous re-evaluation of the operation needs became irregular and less interaction between all levels of governance took place. Consequently, there was a general absence of a communication dynamic that consolidates and widens the scope of participation of all the actors involved, governmental or non-governmental, in different levels.

As indicated by the UNHCR report, the non-existence of a centralised and national policy about the integration of the migrants was also a crucial factor for the difficulty in having more institutional dialogue in the operation. Its absence led to a greater difficulty in the institutional articulation and in having coordinated and planned policies. Therefore, for the improvement of its operational capacity it is important that there is put in place a national pillarised policy regarding the integration and interiorisation of the Venezuelan migrants. For instance, a



national policy could have facilitated the articulation between strategy of interiorisation and other socioeconomic policies in the different governance levels, whereby the strengthening of the operational network could undergo by the Ministry of Citizenship, the task force and the interiorisation nucleus, providing for closer dialogues com local public officials.

Despite these shortcomings, the operation is perceived as a successful example of joined-up action in response to a crisis. What started in 2014 as a local issue soon took larger proportions than anticipated, which is often the case with refugee crisis. Faced with the situation, the Brazilian government was able to successfully gather multiple levels of governance along with international and civil society organisations to tackle and better receive the incoming migrants.

3.1.4 Lessons Learned

The Venezuela migrant crisis put to the test the capacity of the Brazilian government to manage such intense influx in isolated bordering regions. The first lesson would be directly related to the fact that the Brazilian government was able to successfully deal with an unexpected high demand of institutional and organisational planning in such a short notice. In this respect, as aforementioned, operation Acolhida was put in place, planned to help with the reception, triage and integration of the incoming migrants.

A strong contributing factor was the foresight of the Brazilian armed forces which anticipated the eventual need for a civilian-military operation. In anticipation, the armed forces did a training exercise involving logistics similar to Operation Acolhida, called AmazonLog, which later helped with planning and execution. Faced with the situation in Pacaraima, in Roraima, the Army in an exercise of anticipation had already mobilised the necessary logistics and infrastructure, such as technological and communication resources, the connection and accessibility to internet in more remote areas, as well as the necessary staff for such a mission. This allowed Operation Acolhida to happen much more swiftly than it would have happened if not for the anticipation of AmazonLog.

Furthermore, the government structure was able to secure a reliable and solid administrative network between all levels of governance. In an interview with a former government official, it was highlighted the importance of a well-structured and participatory coordination, particularly in the Inter-Ministerial Committee, in order to ensure the success of a given operation. In addition, a possible lesson from Operation Acolhida is the importance of assuring continuity and reliability that can transcend each government's policy, as it was the case with transition from Michel Temer's administration to that of Jair Bolsonaro. Despite different political views at the federal level on the humanitarian crisis in Roraima and Brazil-Venezuela relations, Operation Acolhida was continued.

It is also worth noting that the operation also faced an unprecedented emergency situation, the COVID-19 Pandemic. As it was a matter of public health, the Brazilian Health Ministry in articulation with the armed forces conducted a massive vaccination and immunisation campaign for the Venezuelan migrants, which was positively reviewed by the regional platform



R4V. Another lesson can be drawn from the critical arguments related to the possible improvement to the organisation of the operation. It is crucial that a national and centralised policy is put in place in order to facilitate the institutional dialogue given the scope and scale of this inter-ministerial, interagency and multi-level governance operation. The lack of institutional dialogue with other relevant actors in the planning and organisation of the interiorisation had negative impact on the integration of migrants and overwhelmed local capacities. The absence of such a national policy is directly linked to the communication and operational short-comes in the interiorisation process, a critical axis of this operation.

3.2 Turkey's Border Management: The Syrian Refugee Crisis

3.2.1 The Refugee Crisis

The outbreak of the Syrian war in March 2011 had serious consequences for the neighbouring Turkey, with massive waves of migration over the last 11 years occupying a central place in Turkey's domestic and foreign policy. According to statistics released by Directorate of Migration Management in Turkey, the number of Syrian refugees crossing the Turkish border was lower at the beginning with 14,237 Syrians in 2012, whereas a sharp peak followed and reached 1,519,216 in 2014 (Directorate General of Migration Management, Temporary Protection section, 2022). According to UNCHR, Turkey hosts 3,655,489 Syrian refugees, which constitutes 65.1% of the total 5,615,042 Syrians displaced externally as of September 2022 (UNHCR, Syria Regional Refugee Response, 2022). The Syrian refugee crisis has created several legal and political challenges for Turkey on many fronts. Legally, Turkey had a dual protection system for refugees coming from European and non-European countries, which differentiates Turkey's approach from the European Union's markedly. Turkey put a geographical restriction to the 1951 Geneva Convention, thereby giving refugee status only to European refugees and a conditional refugee status to non-European ones until their permanent settlement to another country by UNCHR (Kaya et al., 2020). From Turkey's dual protection policy ensued multiple and partly conflicting political decisions concerning the Syrian refugees, heavily shaped and intertwined by domestic, regional and international considerations along the way. The Turkish governance in migration rests on legal concerns as well as political considerations and dynamics which together form Turkish joined up external action. Turkey's joined up action presents a solid case exemplifying third countries' experiences in their external action.

3.2.2 Turkey's Joined-Up Response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis

Turkey's response to the Syrian refugee crisis can be examined across three distinct periods: a) the 'open door policy' of 2011 and 2014, b) the formalisation phase of 2013 and 2015 with the Temporary Protection Law (TPL) and the Directorate General of Migration Management and c) the securitisation of Syrian migration waves after 2016 through military and wall-building practices. These periods are differentiated from each other with varying legal and political challenges and encompass Turkey's responses to these challenges combining Turkey's resources with different ministries, agencies as well as policies to put together its



joined-up external action. The main actors that played a significant role in formulating these different policy responses differed from one stage to the other.

The Open-Door Policy of 2011-2014

In response to an unprecedented flow of refugees from Syria, Turkey initially adopted an 'open door policy' which unconditionally allowed all Syrians fleeing the Syrian regime into Turkey through the southern land borders as "guests", which is a category not formally defined either in international or Turkish refugee law (Genç et al., 2019, p. 493). This open-door policy was in radical contrast to the EU's Member States' stance towards the Syrians. No coherent legal and institutional framework of migration management existed at the national level for Syrian guests under dual protection system. There are two main actors in this time period for the coordination of migration policies, the UNHCR in Ankara together with the Turkish Ministry of Interior Affairs, in particular its Agency – the Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD). Accordingly, the UNCHR and Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) were responsible for admitting, evaluating and assisting the Syrian refugees. AFAD, along with relevant municipalities, NGOs and ministries, coordinated the establishment of container cities and camps as well as the provision services such as food, shelter, health, security, education, translation and communication for the refugees (Kahraman & Tanıyıcı, 2018, p. 245). The unconditional open-door policy towards Syrian refugees marked a strong contrast to the EU's migration management. The policy was primarily informed upon the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government's assumption that Syria's Assad regime would shortly fall due to the growing anti-regime protests and that a wave of refugee returns would eventually ensue. The discursive justification rested predominantly on humanitarian considerations framed in religious fraternity terms (Genç et al., 2019, p. 494).

The Formalisation Phase of 2013–2015

Due to the protraction of the conflict, the growing number of refugees outside of the camps in several cities and the realisation that the presence of Syrian refugees on the Turkish territory is no longer a temporary phenomenon, the Turkish authorities took steps to legalise and institutionalise the migration management mechanisms from 2013 onwards. The first of these mechanisms was the establishment of the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) under the Ministry of Interior Affairs in 2013. The DGMM replaced the previous unit responsible for migration in Turkey – the Foreigners Branch of the Directorate General of Security – tied to the Ministry of Interior Affairs. The DGMM is the lead governmental agency for migration tasked with administering activities, developing legislative and administrative capacity, coordinating and monitoring the implementation of policies and strategies determined by the president of the republic and ensuring coordination with relevant public institutions (DGMM, Presidency section, 2022). This new unit replaced the Foreigners Branch and took over all its main functions. DGMM has provincial directorates across 81 cities, 148 districts and also abroad (Aktel & Kaygısız, 2018, p. 596). According to Salihoğlu, 55% of the countries manage migration-related matters with a central agency functioning under the Ministry of Interior, which is the most prevalent institutional form of migration management and which Turkey's DGMM also mimics (2021, pp. 6–7). Apart from DGMM, a Migration Board



was also established in 2013, which has representatives from other ministries and relevant institutions upon the invitation of the Ministry of Interior (Göç İdaresi Başkanlığı, Göç Kurulu, 2022). An inter-ministerial coordination body, the Migration Board is responsible for determining Turkey's migration strategies regarding foreigners and monitoring their coordination and implementation (Salihoğlu, 2021, p. 4; Göç İdaresi Başkanlığı, Göç Kurulu, 2022). The Ministry of Interior is thus assisted by several other ministries and public institutions in migration management including the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Health, the Turkish Employment Agency (ISKUR) under the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkish Red Crescent and local governments (Salihoğlu, 2021, p. 4; Aksel & İçduygu, 2019, p. 17). Additionally, the National Police, Gendarmerie General Command and the Turkish Coast Guard Command are responsible for all internal security and border security issues related to migration (Aksel & İçduygu, 2019, p. 17). These components, ministries, agencies all came together to put together Turkey's joined-up external action on its border management. The Turkish external action rests upon the coordination across these different branches of the Turkish government.

A second mechanism with direct implications for Syrian refugees is the Temporary Protection Regulation (TPR) issued by the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Turkey in October 2014 as per Article 91 of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) (Presidency of Migration Management, Temporary Protection section, 2022). TPR was a new category invented for Syrian 'guests' on the Turkish soil and markedly differed from other categories such as irregular migration, international protection and subsidiary protection. It was an institutionalised attempt to continue granting the Syrian refugees the right of access to Turkish territories; nevertheless, the Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey were neither counted refugees nor asylum seekers according to LFIP (Üstübici, 2019, p. 11). At the same time, the TPR created "a new level of legal differentiation", where the status was given to Syrians "upon their overwhelming numbers, vulnerability and immediate need for protection, whereas all other categories of people claiming international protection in Turkey are required to prove their need for protection" (Üstübici, 2019, p. 11). They have easier access to basic public services such as health, settlement and education and could choose their city of registration upon entrance with the open-door policy, which was not the case for other migration categories (Üstübici, 2019, p. 11). This is again a key difference from the EU's stance on refugees seeking admittance in the EU Member States. Nevertheless, the TPR category also poses certain restrictions, which legally makes it an uncertain and fragile one. As per Article 17, admission to Turkish territories without any valid travel document is possible at the discretion of the provincial Governorate only and, after the transition to the presidential system in Turkey, the President has the right to suspend or limit the existing regulation in case of any national security or public security threat as per Article 15 (Asylum in Europe, Admission to Territory section, 2022).

Turkey's open-door policy together with its further institutionalisation and legalisation efforts focused on Turkey's southern border. However, a shift of focus to western borders was observed from 2015 onwards. The number of Syrian refugees reached over 2.5 million in 2015, which was further complicated by the Syrians' attempt to cross the Aegean Sea for Greece



through illegal and insecure means and lead to a serious migration crisis for the EU (Presidency of Migration Management, Temporary Protection section, 2022). Accordingly, the EU-Turkey Statement (EUTS) and the Joint Action Plan were issued in 2016 and 2017 respectively to prevent irregular migration from Turkey to EU, improve the living conditions of refugees in Turkey and help curb illegal migration, loss of lives and human trafficking networks on the Mediterranean (Kaya et al., 2021, p. 189). The Statement also recognised a 'one-to-one formula', where the EU accepted to settle a Syrian refugee in exchange for one returned to Turkey (European Council, 2016). The EU also agreed to grant visa waivers for Turkish citizens, renew Turkey's accession talks to the EU and provide financial aid for satisfying the education, food and housing needs of refugees in Turkey (Stanicek, 2019). The Turkish-EU cooperation on migration governance involved the introduction of new agencies and policies into the joined-up external action. In particular, the setting up of the DGMM and the dissolution of the Foreigners Branch centralised all policy making instruments on migration.

The Securitisation Phase from 2016 Onwards

A major transformation in Turkey's joined up external action in border management came with the rise of new security risks and domestic political repercussions in 2015. The discursively humanitarian and increasingly legal measures to control Syrian migration flows gradually left their way to even more securitised approaches from 2016 onwards. Internal and external political and security dynamics, both of which were increasingly interlocked over time, shaped Turkey's new policy choices on the Syrian refugees. Internally, the June 2015 General Elections ended up with a 9-point decrease in the percentage of votes for AKP and the incumbent party lost 69 chairs in the parliament, whereas the Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) gained a marked victory with over 13% and 16% of the votes respectively (Seçim Haziran, 2015). This marked turn in the internal power struggles further aggravated due to the 2016 coup attempt against President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the AKP, thereby leading to a sense of regime insecurity and a series of protracted and continually renewed state of emergencies between 2016 and 2018. On the external front, these changes were simultaneously accompanied by a greater territorial control by Kurdish forces in the Syrian territories, Peoples' Defence Units PYG/YPG and the rise of a national security threat perception over a prospectively independent or autonomous Kurdish entity on Turkey's southern border. Finally, a series of terror attacks targeting civilians, police officers, gendarmerie teams across several Turkish cities in 2015 and 2016 made border security in the south a top security concern for Turkey. Most of these attacks were claimed either by PKK, which the Turkish state considers to be organically affiliated with the PYG/YPG in Syria, or by ISIL members who passed through the southern border under the guise of Syrian migrants. The rising popularity of HDP in Turkey as well as the PKK's renewed activism were also considered to be tied to these external dynamics across the Syrian border, and thus a wave of military operations against PKK and the arrest of HDP figures followed. The external security threats impacted Turkish joined-up external action. While the DGMM and the Ministry of Interior Affairs were managing the migrants who are already in Turkey, the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces become important actors adopting new tools of active military involvement in order to manage migratory flows onto Turkish territory.



The securitisation phase of migration management in Turkey covered a series of military operations on the Syrian territory, which are the “Euphrates Shield Operation” in 2016–2017, “Olive Branch Operations” in 2018 and finally “Operation Peace Spring” in 2021 (Çevik, 2022). It should also be noted that although the institutional framework that put the DGMM under the Ministry of Interior as the central migration agency was kept intact, the inter-ministerial balances in migration policymaking changed during this third phase. Accordingly, the Turkish General Staff and the Ministry of Defence became increasingly involved in migration policymaking due to the securitisation of the Syrian migrants. In particular, migration management evolved from adopting tools for their integration into the Turkish society to actual physical prevention of border activities. The involvement of the Turkish armed forces and the Ministry of Defence brought together new tools of migration and operations across the border. Besides, with the transition to the presidential system in 2018, three councils operating under the Presidency, i.e. the Security and Foreign Policy Council, Social Policies Council and Local Governance Policies Council were given a consultative mandate over migration policymaking, thereby accentuating the Presidential mandate over migration policymaking and management (Salihoğlu, 2021, p. 3). This meant that new Councils under the Presidency coordinated migration policies that the DGMM and Ministry of Interior were adopting as well as overseeing the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces’ across the border operations.

The second policy during the securitisation phase was to install a 764 km-long modular security wall alongside its 911 km-long Turkish-Syrian border, whose construction was finalised in 2018 (Global Security, Turkey-Syria Fence, 2022) and included a total of 120 military watch towers called *Kulekol*. These watch towers were built for monitoring illegal activities across the Syrian border, and they are managed by the Turkish military. The physical wall is also fortified with high security doors – all highly resistant to attacks, with most of these doors placed on the Syrian border. The wall and its related measures prevent illegal crossings across the Turkish-Syrian border. The Turkish-Syrian border wall is an example of how physical space constitutes a line of demarcation and an indicator of who belongs in and who does not (Fitzgerald, 2020). At the same time, it illustrates the change in Turkish migration governance parallel to the dual pressures coming from the adaptation to the EU rules and managing the Syrian refugee crisis. This increased surveillance is reminiscent of the EU’s own measures with Frontex, specifically the creation of Rapid Border Intervention Team stationed in Greek towns on the Turkish border in November 2010. Both RABIT and the Turkish-Syrian wall exemplify increased border securitisation. They also demonstrate a significant alteration in the policies of joined-up external action.

Turkey justified the military operations with a third related policy during this phase: an effort to build ‘a safe zone’ in Northern Syria and encourage the return of Syrian refugees in Turkey to their own countries permanently. These across the border operations were authorised by the Turkish President, with a presidential decree to the Ministry of Defence. The safe zone draft plan included a complete infrastructural rebuilding of the northern Syrian cities on an area stretching from Azaz, Jarablus and al-Bab to Tal Abyad and Ain Issa with appropriate housing, hospitals, schools, business centres and mosques for an estimated 1 million potential returnees (Adar, 2020). AFAD and Turkish civil society organisations are the main institutions



involved in this rebuilding of these areas, with an agreement with the local political forces there while an agreement with the Syrian government has not been reached. A 'voluntary repatriation' policy would accompany the resettlement process according to the plan, where Syrian refugees would file a demand to the Presidency of Migration Management in Turkey for a voluntary return and an interview process for their eligibility would follow (Keber, 2022).

Table 2: Policy Phases of Turkey's Migration and Border Management¹

Policy Phase	Important Developments	Actors	Duties
Open-door policy phase (2011–2014)	Syrian people admitted to Turkey <i>en masse</i> as 'guests'	The UNCHR Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) NGOs Local municipalities	Admitting, evaluating and assisting the refugees Coordinating the establishment of container cities and camps Providing basic services to refugees
Formalisation phase (2013–2015)	The Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) passed Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) established Temporary Protection Regulation (TPR) passed The EU-Turkey Statement (EUTS) and the Joint Action Plan issued	Ministry of Interior and DGMM	Lead governmental agency for migration Developing legislation and administrative capacity Monitoring the implementation of migration-related policies issued by the president of the republic Determining stateless persons and taking action

¹ For the data in the table, see Aktel, M., and Kaygısız, Ü. (2018). Türkiye'de Göç Yönetimi. Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi 23(2): 579–604; Aksel, D. & İçduygu, A. (2019). *Borders and the Mobility of Migrants in Turkey*. CEASEVAL Research on the Common European Asylum System, 32; Salihoğlu, A. (2021, August). *Migration Governance in Turkey: Is there An Alternative Approach in Light of International Standards and Trends?* International Refugee Rights Association. <https://umhd.org.tr/en//upload/Dokuman/opt-goc-yonetiminde-turkiye-EGFCTAU7S9ZDTSCKP1OT.pdf> ; Presidency. <https://en.goc.gov.tr/about-us> ; Kahraman, S. and Taniyıcı, Ş. (2018). Türkiye'de Suriyeli Sığınmacılar Örneğinde Çok Düzeyli Göç Yönetişimi. TESAM Akademi Dergisi, 5(1): 238-280.



			<p>Carrying out actions related to migration and the harmonisation processes</p> <p>Coordinating between public institutions and organisations</p>
		<p>Migration Board</p> <p>Representatives from other ministries and institutions invited by the Ministry of Interior such as Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health, the Turkish Employment Agency (ISKUR) under the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkish Red Crescent and local governments, etc.</p>	<p>Determining Turkey's overall migration strategies regarding foreigners</p>
		<p>The National Police</p> <p>The Gendarmerie General Command</p> <p>The Turkish Coast Guard Command</p>	<p>Attending to domestic and border security issues related to migration</p>
<p>Securitisation phase (2018–today)</p>	<p>Euphrates Shield Operation (2016–2017)</p> <p>Olive Branch Operation (2018)</p> <p>Syrian-Turkish border security wall (2018)</p> <p>Operation Peace Spring (2021)</p> <p>The safe-zone policy</p>	<p>The Turkish General Staff</p> <p>The Ministry of Defence</p> <p>The Presidency and its three councils: the Security and Foreign Policy Council, Social Policies Council and Local Governance Policies Council</p> <p><i>*in addition to DGMM, Ministry of Interior and the other institutions in the Migration Board</i></p>	<p>Determining Turkey's overall migration strategies regarding foreigners</p> <p><i>*in addition to all the duties carried out by DGMM, Ministry of Interior and the other institutions in the Migration Board</i></p>



3.2.3 Challenges and Lessons Learned

The Turkish joined-up action in its external policy puts together multiple actors and agencies together. These actors are the DGMM, Ministry of Interior, the Migration Board, the Ministry of Defence and most importantly after 2018, the Presidency and the Councils under the Presidency as shown in the table above. While joined-up action in managing migration has internal and external components, Turkey's external action in this realm presents the EU with an example to be emulated in terms of coordination between different governmental actors. Multiple and partly contradictory migration and border control policies against the massive flow of Syrian refugees were applied by Turkey since 2011. These policies involved different ministries and agencies with new tools formulated in line with the different challenges in different periods. One central question concerns the durability and effectiveness of these policies in Turkey's border control efforts. The open-door policy was a unique migration management policy that markedly differed from other migration and border management policies across the world including that of the EU. Turkey provided a haven for the greatest number of Syrian refugees in the world, fleeing the war, both regionally and internationally. However, the open-door policy created legal, institutional and domestic political challenges for a country like Turkey, which was a transit country and had applied a dual migration policy for European and non-European migrants until then. Turkey made an attempt to address the legal and institutional challenges by introducing the TPR, establishing DGMM and extending the number of public institutions involved in migration governance. Nevertheless, TPR is a very fragile category, is at the discretion of the Presidency and has been very much open to politicisation by opposition parties due to the growing unpopularity of the open-door policy. In a social and political trends survey dated 2016, to the question "What sort of policies should Turkey follow regarding refugees?", 37% of Turkish citizens responded as "no more refugees should be accepted and those previously accepted should be sent back" and 25.7% responded as "no more refugees should be accepted and those previously accepted should not be sent back" (Aydın et al., 2016, p. 36). By 2021, the level of Turkish public discontent had risen to 68.9%, where most respondents cited Syrian refugees as a source of cheap labour and crime and as recipients of scarce resources and state privileges (Aydın et al., 2021). While the incumbent AKP has taken a more securitised approach to migration management due to its national security and regime security implications, the opposition parties are increasingly articulating repatriation as an election pledge (Diken, Partilerin Sığınmacı Politikası: Kim Ne Vaad Ediyor, 2022).

As far as Turkey's cross-border military operations in Syria, the safe zone plan and voluntary repatriation policies on the southern border are concerned, the results are mixed and further remain to be seen. Since the launch of Euphrates Operation in 2016, a total of 521,039 Syrian refugees voluntarily returned to Syria (Suriyelilerin Gönüllü Geri Dönüşleri, 2022). Since the end of August 2022, a total of 40,465 Syrians returned voluntarily to safe zone areas (Suriyelilerin Gönüllü Geri Dönüşleri, 2022). Nevertheless, concerns abound among Syrian refugees who are under temporary protection in Turkey for a long time and are now presented the option of voluntary return primarily over prospective security issues, lack of employment opportunities, access to basic commodities and high housing rents in the safe zone areas (Suriyelilerin



Gönüllü Geri Dönüşleri, 2022). As for ‘the one-to-one formula’ agreed on with the EU, the border protection on the west failed to a measurable extent due to its association with several political issues between Turkey and Greece. Turkey first suspended the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement due to the contestation over Turkey’s gas-drilling rights in the Eastern Mediterranean, the EU’s sanctions against Turkey and the EU’s failure to lift visas for Turkish citizens as promised (Kaya et al., 2021, p. 189). Besides, in the 2019 European Commission Report on Turkey, the EU voiced a strong condemnation of Turkey’s military interventions in Syria for undermining stability and security in the region (European Parliament, 2021). Turkey’s loss of 34 soldiers in Syria due to a coordinated attack on Turkish forces in Idlib on 27 February 2020, the EU’s lack of military and political support for Turkey’s resettlement plans across the border and the failure of the ‘one-to-one formula’ led Turkey to declare that it opened its Pazarkule border in Edirne for Greece in February 2020, thereby leading to a humanitarian crisis on the Greek-Turkish border (Göçmenlere Avrupa Kapıları Açıldı, 2020).

In short, Turkey’s joined-up external action on border management involved multiple agencies, Ministries and the adoption of different policy instruments. These policies – in particular the open-door policy – differed significantly from the EU’s external action. In addition, when Turkey shifted into a different external action with military operations across its border as well as building physical walls to safeguard its southern border, it demonstrated the changes in external action when other agencies become more prominent. The Turkish experience in terms of joined up action with multiple actors, agencies, ministries and even civil society organisations provide a unique example of how a third country adopts different policies in its external action-with join up of various components. The presence of a centralised governmental framework with a high degree of policy coherence amongst different governmental units enhanced the effectiveness of Turkish external actions.

3.3 Mainstreaming Artificial Intelligence into the United States’ Defence: The Joint Artificial Intelligence Center

3.3.1 Description of the Problem

The EU’s technological sovereignty (Csernaton, 2022) has been at the centre of political and policy discussions related to reducing critical dependencies in the case of dual use emerging and disruptive technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), quantum computing and Big Data, to name a few. Importance has been given to geopolitical pressures and an increasingly challenging global environment, where “the EU needs to maintain its technological edge and support its industrial base’, particularly in ‘[d]isruptive technologies, including Artificial Intelligence [...] a technology inducing a disruption or a paradigm shift, i.e. a radical than an incremental change. Development of such a technology is “high risk, high potential impact”, and the concept applies equally to the civil, defence and space sectors. Disruptive technologies for defence can be based on concepts or ideas originating from non-traditional defence actors and find their origins in spin-ins from the civil domain” (European Commission, 2021, pp. 1, 13; Müller et al., 2021 ([ENGAGE Working Paper 1](#))).



Importantly, the definition points towards the dual-use nature of emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) such as AI, and why the EU should prioritise synergies regarding dual-use research and development programmes for both civil and military domains. These include the security envelope in the EU's Horizon Europe programme, the European Commission's European Defence Fund (EDF), the EU Defence Innovation Scheme and the European Defence Innovation Hub (HEDI). The aim of such EU-led dual-use and defence innovation efforts is to boost home-grown research, development and cross-fertilisation across civil and defence industries in Europe in order to make sure that EU instruments are better prepared for the future battlefield and the next generation of AI-powered military technologies. The end-goal is also to ensure consistency between European Commission-led internal defence technological and industrial innovation policies (Csernaton, 2021) in key strategic domains such as (military) AI and the EU's external action efforts and the work of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Defence Agency (EDA).

However, when it comes to cutting-edge technological sectors such as AI systems, stepping up efforts both at the national, regional and supranational levels in the EU is challenging. Connecting the dots between various civil and military innovation initiatives, as well as internal and external EU policy instruments is easier said than done, especially regarding military AI and mainstreaming this emerging technology in security and defence practices. The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is a case in point, given the fact that the EU, according to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, has no competence in defence matters, which fall under the purview of the EU's Member States (Csernaton & Mavrona, 2022). This limited coherence risks creating a disconnect between various funding instruments, institutional priorities and policy outcomes concerning AI for defence purpose, perpetuating siloed thinking across civil or military-oriented policy initiatives at the EU and Member States levels. Based on these identified challenges, it is worth examining how other strong global players such as United States (US) approach policy and institutional options for strengthening military AI, by zooming in on the case of the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC).

Set up in 2018 by the US Department of Defense (DoD), the JAIC aimed at seizing 'the transformative potential of Artificial Intelligence technology for the benefit of America's national security' (CDAO, 2022a). In January 2019, Lieutenant General John N.T. 'Jack' Shanahan was appointed as the inaugural Director of the JAIC. Noteworthy is the fact that Shanahan spearheaded Project Maven (Hoijsink, 2022), also known as the Algorithmic Warfare Cross-Function Team, launched in April 2017, with companies like Xnor, Clarifai and Google. Project Maven triggered public controversy when over 3000 Google employees signed a petition in protest against the company's involvement with the DoD's AI project aimed to study drone footage that could be eventually used to improve drone strikes capabilities in the battlefield. Importantly, Shanahan's vision was to connect the dots between the military, academia and the commercial sector to bring about AI solutions as algorithmic warfare starts to become a reality (Pellerin, 2017). Furthermore, he advocated for a decentralised approach to the research, innovation, development and experimentation of AI in order for the US to win the global strategic competition with China (Johnson, 2019). AI systems were identified as



being at the centre of both national security and economic prosperity, becoming a target for DoD efforts to match up internal civil-military innovation efforts with preserving the US' geopolitical leadership on the international stage.

3.3.2 Description of Joined-up Actions and Different Entities Involved

Designed as the official institutional linchpin for the DoD's AI Strategy, the Centre's work was closely aligned with Shanahan's vision of AI power projection. The creation of the JAIC should also be contextualised against the background of a broader US AI momentum and alongside the release in February 2019 of both the White House's Executive Order on Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence (White House, 2019) and the 2018 unclassified Summary of the DoD's AI Strategy (Department of Defense, 2019). Set against growing geopolitical rivalries between the US and China, where technology and the so-called 'AI arms race' are increasingly emerging as key aspects of Great-Power competition (Brattberg et al., 2020), the JAIC's mandate was to operationalise DoD's AI Strategy and to explore the use of AI, particularly Edge Computing, Network of Networks and AI-enhanced communication for deployment in actual combat. The first objective was to prioritise the use of AI systems to solve complex problems spanning across multiple combat systems and to have real-time access to ever-improving AI tools and data sets. The second objective was to harness AI advances in the civilian private sector in line with the 2018 unclassified Summary of the DoD's AI Strategy, according to which AI is "also poised to change the character of the future battlefield and the pace of threats we must face" (Department of Defense, 2019, p. 4).

In doing so, the JAIC's mission was to examine how AI has the potential to transform all functions of the DoD in a beneficial way, from using "AI-enabled information, tools and systems to empower, not replace, those who serve" to "identifying appropriate use cases for AI across DoD, rapidly piloting solutions and scaling successes across our enterprise" (Department of Defense, 2019, p. 4). As a focal institutional actor within the DoD to deliver on such an ambitious agenda, the JAIC's role was to 'scale the Department-wide impact of AI and synchronise DoD AI activities to expand Joint Force advantages' (Department of Defense, 2019, p. 9). Among the DoD's stated priorities for the JAIC, three are particularly relevant for the EU's approaches to (military) AI:

1. Facilitating the mainstreaming of AI into DoD governance and policy structures via multilateral coordination, complementing "the efforts of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), DoD laboratories and other entities focused on longer-term technology creation and future AI research and development" such as the commercial sector and academia (Department of Defense, 2019, p. 9). Indeed, while the JAIC was not intended to implement all of the AI initiatives with the DoD, it was meant to establish a joint common foundation.
2. Leading "strategic data acquisition and introducing unified data stores, reusable tools, frameworks and standards and cloud and edge services" (Department of Defense, 2019, p. 9), with the JAIC's primary area of interest being edge computing (European



Commission, 2022), a distributed computing paradigm enabling real-time sensor data processing closer to the sources of data.

3. Cultivating “a world-class AI team to supply trusted subject matter expertise on AI capability delivery and to create new accelerated learning experiences in AI across DoD at all levels of professional education and training” (Department of Defense, 2019, p. 9).

As a subdivision of the United States Armed Forces, the JAIC was the official linchpin of the DoD AI Strategy. The new entity was established under the Chief Information Officer (CIO) of the DoD, itself subordinated to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). In short, the JAIC was tasked to draw lessons and best practices when it comes to harnessing data and edge computing solutions; fostering public-private relations with the AI industry for developing specific applications; and building in-house high-tech knowhow and AI expertise. This would bridge research and operations gaps in military AI via the fast and safe insertion of this emerging technology into complex governance and work systems across Military Services or Departments. In this respect, the work of the JAIC, as a focal point of the DoD’s AI Strategy, was to sustain the DoD-wide adoption of AI capabilities. The JAIC thus presents an interesting case of institutional innovation within the DoD’s governance structures, principally prompted by an increasing need to put forward a comprehensive national strategy for the adoption of AI-enabled technologies for security and defence purposes. It further materialises the DoD’s approach to set up a one-stop-shop type of interstitial hub (Bátora, 2013), best positioned to help policy makers, managers and military personnel to table data-driven AI solutions for warfare, as well as identify potential challenges and obstacles. From this perspective, the JAIC emerged at the interstices between various fields, recombining the delivery of concrete military AI projects, capacity building efforts across the DoD’s civil and military governance structures, with public and private funding resources.

In terms of joined-up action, the case of setting up the JAIC with the explicit goal to accelerate “the delivery of AI-enabled capabilities, scaling the Department-wide impact of AI and synchronised DoD AI activities to expand Joint Force advantage” was not an isolated institutional innovation (Department of Defense, 2019, p. 9). It is set against the background of a wider technopolitical imaginary targeting AI-driven “fully integrated, comprehensive and real-time ‘situational awareness’ across US theatres of operation” (Suchman, 2022, p. 1) and a whole-of-society ‘team of America’ approach, involving the US Congress, Big Tech Companies, academia and the DoD. For instance, as part of the John S McCain National Defense Authorisation Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (NDAA), the US Congress created the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI). Former Google CEO Eric Schmidt was appointed Chair of the Commission and former Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work was appointed Co-Chair. Moreover, members of the Commission included current and former CEOs and other senior managers of Big Tech companies, such as Amazon, Google, Microsoft and Oracle, as well as current and former members of the defence and intelligence agencies and senior members of universities with extensive DoD funding, such as the California Institute of Technology and Carnegie Mellon University (Suchman, 2022). Schmidt has been extremely



influential in shaping the DoD's high-tech organisations and strategies in recent years, also as chairman of the Defense Innovation Board (DIB). Compared to the JAIC, DIB is an independent advisory board create in 2016 to facilitate the transfer of best practices and technological innovation from Silicon Valley to the military domain. It is governed by the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FAC) and provides independent recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. Overall, the role of the JAIC was to propose a comprehensive approach to US's strategy on military AI, being specifically created to bring together the DoD's various AI-focused projects, programmes and tools. Two years after its creation in 2018, the JAIC's portfolio further expanded towards building closer cooperation with the AI industry, especially technological giants from Silicon Valley. The Pentagon's keen interest in Silicon Valley is premised on a desire to harness the innovation power of commercial players that have been typically disinterested in pursuing business opportunities with the DoD, since, put simply, "venture capital offers more money, more certainty and more flexibility" (Stanley-Lockman, 2015, p. 2). The issue was not so much about innovating, but rather in how to best harness such innovation, as well as to capitalise on fast paced technological innovation. In recent years, the DoD, other US government agencies and a bipartisan consensus in Congress have recognised that China is strategically leveraging its military-civil fusion in science, technology and innovation strategy (Kania, 2019) and all other instruments of statecraft to restructure the world order.

To counter the technological military-civil assertiveness of China, the DoD would indeed need to convince "Silicon Valley that national-security-related issues are interesting enough to compensate for the lack of profitability", and that "the DoD and Silicon Valley share a common threat perception" (Seligman, 2018; Stanley-Lockman, 2015, p. 2). In order to attract such big commercial-tech players, the DoD also required to change its organisational culture, not least because the DoD's day-to-day practices and military jargon were unfamiliar to civilian entrepreneurial settings (Stanley-Lockman, 2015). From this perspective, it could be argued that the creation of the JAIC was also intended to bridge the cultural divide between the Pentagon and the commercial-tech sector, also in terms of normalising less risk aversion and agile processes in the research and development of military high-tech capabilities. For example, in 2020, the JAIC was itself working on "30 different projects across six different areas including joint warfighting operations, warfighter health, business process transformation, threat reduction and protection, joint logistics and joint information warfare" (Tadjdeh, 2020). Joint warfighting was aimed at contributing to Pentagon's numerous efforts, such as joint all-domain command-and-control. The joint warfighting mission initiative was the JAIC's flagship product, exploring the ways in which the United States will go to war, from joint all-domain command-and-control to the Air Force's Advanced Battle Management system programme. Yet again, the stated goal was to make AI and data-driven tools available across the US military services, which would help harmonise DoD projects and reduce inefficiencies. According to Dana Deasy, former Department of Defense Chief Information Officer (DoD CIO), the JAIC's journey was still evolving, with the US military "generating positive momentum from our early days as AI pioneers toward a mature organisation of AI practitioners" (Tadjdeh, 2020). When it comes to AI literacy-building efforts within the DoD's workforce (Bastian, 2020), a guide published in April 2020 is worth mentioning, namely *Understanding AI Technology. A*



concise, practical and readable overview of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning technology designed for non-technical managers, officers and executives (Allen, 2020). Written by Greg Allen, former Chief of Strategy and Communications at the JAIC and former Director of Strategy and Policy, the guide served as a useful resource and introduction to the basics of AI and Machine Learning (ML).

3.3.3 Main Benefits of Joined-Up Action

In terms of main challenges, Deasy further noted that “the true long-term success of the JAIC will depend on how the organisation adapts and delivers real-world solutions when the strategic landscape and priorities change” (2020). Given such a promising assessment, it came as a surprise (or not) that the DoD’s governance practices further shifted in 2022, when the JAIC, the Defense Digital Service (DDS), the Office of Advancing Analytics - Advana were merged into a unified organisation, The Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer (CDAO). Thus, the JAIC ceased to be recognised as a self-standing entity and signalled the fact that an even more comprehensive solution was sought after to solve the DoD-wide Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) challenges related to the future of warfare under the impact of emerging and disruptive digital technologies. Set up in February 2022, the CDAO aims to further streamline the DoD’s business processes and warfighting capabilities by adopting a cross-sectoral approach between AI, data, analytics and digital services – “to generate decision advantage across, from the boardroom to the battlefield” (CDAO, 2022b).

The reason for the merger is that the CDAO has been designed to create synergies and bring together different high-tech experts under one roof in the latest effort to scale a ‘different operating model’ and ‘feedback loops’ for creating and delivering digital technologies for the DoD. Margie Palmieri, the Deputy Chief Digital and artificial Intelligence Officer, compared it to a major merger and acquisition activity in industry:

Companies go into mergers and acquisitions to be competitive, [...] And that’s exactly what the Department of Defense is doing. We are increasing our competitive advantage by bringing these different groups together. And for the first time in my career of over 15 years in government at this point, all the right levers of change and influence are coming into play in the CDAO. (Palmieri, 2022, as cited in Doubleday, 2022)

Importantly, Palmieri further noted that software, digital technologies and data analytics demand alternative approaches in order to scale across the Pentagon. The various organisations coming together under the CDAO all have the experience and expertise in piloting such alternative approaches to the Pentagon’s traditional development and procurement processes of conventional capabilities, such as aircraft, ships and vehicles (Doubleday, 2022).

Consequently, the goal of the CDAO is to further consolidate a “strong foundation for data, analytic and AI-enabled capabilities to be developed and fielded at scale [...] ensuring the Department has the necessary people, platforms and processes needed to continuously



provide business leaders and warfighters with agile solutions” (CDAO, 2022b). Interestingly, the organisational bricolage (Mérand, 2012) nature of the CDAO is legitimised by the need to rationalise civil and military digital and AI-enabled solutions across the DoD to address urgent crises and emerging challenges. Hence, the intention is to build a flexible and agile interface that seamlessly matches the corporate ethos of the business community, the ‘boardroom’, with the strategic, operational and tactical needs of warfighting, the ‘battlefield’.

At the time of its creation, the JAIC was envisioned to fulfil a much-needed coordination function between various DoD initiatives with a view to giving the US the much needed strategic and technological edge in the emerging AI arms race with China. The Center was tasked to attract world class AI talent within the DoD’s civil and military personnel ranks, stimulate project-driven AI innovation across military services and, importantly, boost innovation at the intersection of AI tools and large-scale data systems. Indeed, there is no AI without data. One lesson learned from the JAIC’s mandate is that the Center could not deliver on all of the AI initiatives within the DoD, but rather was intended to lay the groundwork for a common approach to military AI. It showcased the Pentagon’s consistent goal to accelerated defence innovation relating to AI, coupled by the realisation that a mature AI military ecosystem cannot be achieved without holistically streamlining the DoD’s approaches across AI, Data and Analytics at speed and scale, as now intended by the recently created CDAO.

3.3.4 Lessons Learned

AI has become broadly acknowledged as the technology of the 21st century that is vital to geopolitical competition and the future of US national security. Yet, contrasting to earlier periods, the Pentagon is no longer in the driving seat when it comes to the research, development, investment and innovation of emerging and disruptive technologies such as AI. Instead, big tech companies “that derive the bulk of their revenues from nondefense sources employ the greatest reservoirs of AI talent and invest the majority of capital into improving their AI algorithms” (Voss & Ryseff, 2022, p. v). Thus, the Pentagon has pursued closer and more effective collaborative avenues with Silicon Valley companies, while also triggering changes in institutional structures, organisational culture, as well as skillsets and mindsets. By integrating into one organisation the JAIC with the DDS, the Chief Data Officer and the enterprise platform Advana, the DoD and the CDAO have put forward a joined-up action across public and private sectors and regarding data, analytics and AI-enabled resources and capabilities. Thus, the JAIC’s creation and consequent merger into the recently created CDAO both present interesting case studies for the EU and its Member States: when it comes to best practices for institutional creativity; and regarding lessons learned from important innovative shifts within traditionally rigid military organisational cultures.

Both the JAIC and the CDAO signify important moments of institutional growth for the DoD by taking AI and data seriously and in order to harness emerging and disruptive technologies to their full potential. Data is the ‘food’ for AI and having quality and easy-to-use data will be vital for the Pentagon’s ability to successfully implement AI-enabled systems and processes (Kahn & Horowitz, 2021). This is reflected in joined-up actions in response to the challenges brought about by the confluence of mostly civilian emerging and disruptive digital technologies, from



AI, data analytics, to other digital technologies across the civil and military domains. The analysis has shown that the DoD, the US Congress and other stakeholders such as tech companies and academia have taken proactive actions to mainstream the uptake of AI systems into national defence policy and the DoD's practices, including reskilling personnel, and by especially emphasising civil-military synergies with the private companies most active in this field. In this respect, two dimensions were identified as essential for the success of joined-up action: first, a common threat perception across civil, commercial and military domains concerning emerging challenges; and second, a proficient level of AI and data literacy and expertise within key DoD institutional structures. The end goal has been to ensure US defence innovation leadership via facilitating considerable institutional changes and effective coordinating efforts to create a more holistic and integrated approach to AI and data analytics, in line with a new organisational model to scale up key (digital) technologies across the DoD.



4 Tackling the Challenges of Joined-Up Action: Drawing Lessons

The case of Brazil's border management during the refugee crisis originating in Venezuela reveals the importance of top-down and tailor-made initiatives in order to bring together relevant actors at moments of crisis. Operation Acolhida assembled multiple levels of the Brazilian government and channelled cooperation with non-governmental organisations, both national and international. It also gave a more coherent structure to the cooperation between civilian and military components of border management, even if this interaction and the precise division of labour changes over time. As such, tailor-made initiatives can enhance coherence and effectiveness of joined-up action by fostering interagency cooperation and multi-stakeholder coordination. Such initiatives also have the potential to build momentum around policy solutions, fostering coordination different actors around unified goals. The Brazilian case also shows that, given the right political leadership and status, these ad-hoc, but formalised, joined-up operations can be sustainable over time and continue despite change in government. Finally, momentum around joined-up operations can also increase acceptability of policymaking through clear messaging and communication by the various actors involved. Operation Acolhida in Brazil can teach the European Union several lessons about joined-up action that relate to inter-agency coordination, integration of resources and flexibility and adaptation to quickly adjust to changing circumstances and evolving needs.

The Turkish case in terms of external border management reveals the internal and external policy challenges in external action. While different ministries and agencies were involved in the formulation of Turkish policy in migration, power balances between these agencies and their diverging preferences determined the effectiveness of these policy actions. The policy initiatives which ranged from open door policy, to building of physical walls and military action across the external borders were based on ad hoc legal changes and long-term planning for border management. As the border management policy goes through different phases, it shows the importance of constant review and adaptation in joined-up actions. The case shows that complex joined-up actions require constant revision of the way that they are structured and how communication flows amongst different actors. The establishment of the Migration Board, in particular, centralised the coordination of Turkey's approach to migration issues and fostered the coordination of different services such as health and education with other government agencies and international organisations to ensure a comprehensive and integrated approach to migration management.

When it comes to the US case study, there are several challenges that the EU could learn from about joined-up action in mainstreaming AI in security and defence. While the EU has been a frontrunner in tackling regulatory, ethical, economic and societal issues concerning the growing deployment of civil AI systems in various areas of life, it has paid little attention to the use of AI in the security and defence realms. First, given the EU's unique institutional architecture, the challenge is to put forward innovative structural and institutional changes within the EU's governance of security and defence. As in the US case, there is a need to better



connect the dots between the European Commission's supranational agenda-setting power in the field of defence, by supporting more lucrative and dual-use joint research, innovation, investment schemes in cutting-edge technologies such as AI, the intergovernmentalism that dominates CSDP crisis management policy objectives and the goal of the European Defence Agency (EDA) to mainstream shared thinking on military AI across EU Member States. Here, emphasis should be given not only to developing common thinking on the threat landscape across Member States and within EU institutional structures, but also on what (military) AI strategically means for EU security and defence. This would help the EU and Member States harmonise approaches on military AI, as it features differently in national (defence) strategies, from France showing a strong interest in military AI, seen as part of a fierce geopolitical competition, to the polar opposite, Germany, which consider AI only as a societal and economic concern. On top of the challenge to first put the EU house in order, the second challenge is to foster strategic partnerships with the commercial and civil sectors, by nurturing public and private solutions with the European AI and data analytics ecosystems, especially when it comes to industry, start-ups and academia. In this regard, joined-up efforts between the Commission and the EDA to streamline business processes and defence capabilities would require innovative approaches to exploit agile and cross-sectoral solutions, indeed 'from the boardroom to the battlefield'. Significantly, the third challenge, as in the case of the US, is to upgrade, invest in and recruit AI and data analytics expertise within the EU. Such emerging technological domains require advanced and niche skills, as well as alternative business and governance approaches in order to be properly mainstream and scale AI systems. Hence, the challenge is to create flexible and agile platforms such as the CDAO to pair the expertise and corporate ethos of the business community indeed effortlessly, the 'boardroom', with the strategic, operational and tactical needs of warfighting, the 'battlefield'. Ultimately, recruiting AI talent, the need to change military mindsets and skillsets and the goal to trigger innovate changes in institutional structures and organisational cultures across national, intergovernmental, supranational, military and commercial realms, all remain important challenges for more EU joined-up action on military AI.



5 Conclusion

Challenges of coherence, sustainability and effectiveness of EU external action are, more often than not, accentuated in areas that require joined-up efforts. The different case studies of challenges faced by countries with complex governance structures shed light on possible pathways for the European Union. There are, however, two important caveats to be considered when drawing lessons from the experience of third countries. The first caveat refers to the comparability of the European Union, its policies and institutional arrangement, with other political entities such as (less institutionalised) regional and international organisations or nation states. On the one hand, the *sui generis* EU governance structure, mixing supranational and intergovernmental features, is a potential methodological obstacle for direct comparison with other polities. On the other hand, specific comparisons with other entities' policies and institutions, with the goal of drawing lessons or seeking inspiration for policy recommendations, is possible. The second caveat refers to the major variation across the case studies, which have differences in terms of the level of policy and decision-making, the analytical choices and other variables relating to actors and context in which the countries are embedded. As such, it is not possible to draw lessons for the European directly from the comparison across cases, but it is possible to reflect on the cases and the potential adaptability of such lessons to the complex case of the European Union. Such lessons, or recommendations, can be tested against the relevant scholarship on EU external action and against the EU's own experience of institutional reform and policymaking.

The case studies above show that, like the EU, individual countries are not unfamiliar with problems and shortcomings of joined-up action, especially when dealing with complex issues such as migration crisis or artificial intelligence. As such, reforms of EU external action, by means of permanent institutional change, do not guarantee the solution for problems of joined-up action. After all, individual countries themselves already have clear hierarchical structures and yet face challenges in the planning and execution of policies and actions. In fact, what the cases studies help to demonstrate is that solutions for more efficient, coherent and sustainable policy responses can be found beyond large institutional changes. This is the case of the Operation Acolhida in the Brazilian case, which builds momentum and brings various actors together around a common decision-making structure. It is also the case of the set-up of the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center in the United States as a focal point that brings various stakeholders together, and the case of the continuous learning process and institutional adaptation in the case the Turkey migration policies. Such initiatives can help tackle issues of fragmentation in the legal base, of contradicting policy objectives and of insufficient communication between different units and institutions. Hence, policy recommendations for more coherent, sustainable and effective EU external action can take into account innovative solutions for joined-up action that go beyond treaty change or permanent institutional rearrangements, which are themselves much harder to achieve in contested political times.



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