ENGAGE
ENVISIONING A NEW GOVERNANCE ARCHITECTURE FOR A GLOBAL EUROPE

INITIAL BRIEFING FOR PRACTITIONERS #2

ENGAGE – Envisioning a New Governance Architecture for a Global Europe

December 2022

How can the EU – both its institutions and its Member States – effectively and sustainably harness all of its tools in a joined-up external action alongside the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in order to meet strategic challenges and become a stronger global actor?

FOREWORD

How can the EU – both its institutions and its Member States – effectively and sustainably harness all of its tools in a joined-up external action alongside the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) to meet strategic challenges and become a stronger global actor?

This is the question guiding the work of the Horizon 2020 project **ENGAGE** ('Envisioning a New Governance Architecture for a Global Europe'), which will culminate in the publication of a **White Paper** on Joined-up, Coherent, Sustainable and Effective EU External Action in June 2024.

In the lead-up to this point, researchers in the ENGAGE project are studying internal and external challenges to the EU, four interlocking policy dimensions of the EU's external action external action (see figure on next page) and three strategic objectives (engaging with strategic partners, engaging with the EU's neighbourhoods and engaging in conflict resolution, prevention and mediation), while also laying the grounds for the White Paper.

This brief presents practitioner-oriented implications from the research conducted across all areas in the second year of the project. **Four sets of takeaways are presented.** For each takeaway, we include a link to the original research paper it was derived from.

The first set focuses on the **acceptability of EU efforts in defence and security** in the national parliaments of Member States and among the public. When it comes to **national parliaments**, the full effects of the Russian invasion of Ukraine are still to develop; yet ENGAGE research shows that national parliamentarians have been predisposed to supporting EU crisis management for some time. High levels of support for EU civilian and military missions are registered across the political spectrum. When opposition to CSDP operations arises, it most often comes from parties on the outer edges of the political spectrum (both left and right), who often seek to disassociate themselves from mainstream parties. Big data-based media analysis also reveals broad and steady acceptability among the **public** for EU efforts in defence and security, and this trend has only accelerated following the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

A second set of takeaways is related to **structural changes in the EU's external environment.** In their national security and foreign policy strategies, Member States largely converge in their assessment of the **overall geopolitical environment** and broad security challenges; but there is significant variation among them when it comes to particular concerns (often related to Member States' geography, size and political context). In **global governance**, a marked shift is underway, where traditional international organisations (IOs) are increasingly complemented by informal structures without clear hierarchy. This holds both opportunities and challenges for the EU, whose treaty basis and resulting processes and policies remain focused on traditional IOs.

A third group of takeaways begins with the **legal bases** for the EU's external action, which remain scattered among the two treaties (TEU and TFEU). This leads to uncertainties on the correct legal basis for action, with ensuing internal debates affecting the efficiency of policymaking. This takeaway set also includes results of interviews and surveys with national policymaking elites on **decision-making procedures and governance structures** for the EU's external action. This research shows that following the Russian

invasion of Ukraine, a window of opportunity may have opened to a regular discussion in the Council on moving towards qualified majority voting (QMV) in CFSP matters. In the meantime, alternatives such as enabling or passarelle clauses could be activated. National policymakers are also re-evaluating all available defence and security tools following the invasion, creating opportunities for increased application of PESCO, and potentially use of coalitions of the willing (Art. 44) and solidarity (Art. 222) and military assistance (Art. 42) clauses. However, using the latter three options would require more clarity on interpretations of these clauses and their operationalisation.

The fourth and final set of takeaways relate to various **tools, policies and strategies** of the EU's external action. This broad set includes recommendations on **assessment criteria** for defence cooperation and on measures to increase mutual trust to further improve **intelligence cooperation** in the EU. It also points to the opportunity to boost **coherence between all instruments** in the EU's external action toolbox (including not just CSDP/CFSP but also trade, development, climate, health and other policies), for instance through an expanded Integrated Approach. A final set of takeaways focuses on the need for a clearer and more coherent definition of **strategic partnerships**; greater coherence between discourse on the **European Neighbourhood Policy** and its *de facto* practices; and the importance of early warning systems and coordination across all phases when it comes to **conflict management** interventions and strategies.

Over the course of 2023 and 2024, ENGAGE researchers will continue producing original research papers, which will ultimately be translated into a set of six specialised **policy briefs**. **A first wave – published mid-2023 – will focus on specific layers of the EU's external action**: the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP); the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); and all policies contributing to external action beyond CSDP/CFSP – that is, classical areas of external action (trade, development and humanitarian aid) and "external action plus" (the outward dimension of traditionally internal policy areas such as competition, environment and health). **The second wave – expected in early 2024 – will focus on three strategic objectives:** engaging with strategic partners, engaging with the EU's neighbourhoods and engaging in conflict resolution, prevention, and mediation. Finally, the work of the ENGAGE project will conclude with the publication of the **White Paper on Joined-up, Coherent, Sustainable and Effective EU External Action,** in June 2024.

EXTERNAL ACTION PLUS
Including peripheral
and sectoral diplomacies

EXTERNAL ACTION
Including trade, development,
and humanitarian aid

CFSP

CSDP

01 | TAKEAWAYS ON ACCEPTABILITY OF EU EFFORTS IN DEFENCE AND SECURITY

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01 **Support for EU civilian and military missions is generally high in national parliaments, across Member States and across the political spectrum.** Overall, support for CSDP operations is also higher than support for crisis responses outside of EU structures. While it is not yet clear how the war in Ukraine will affect patterns of parliamentary support, it is clear that national parliamentarians have been predisposed to supporting EU crisis management for some time.

EU crisis management deployments in accordance with the Petersberg Tasks guidelines are dependent on Member States' national parliaments approving their military forces travelling abroad. Through a large survey of 13 national parliamentary public records (2016–2021), the degree of acceptability of these missions was gauged. Overall, a very high level of support was found across Member States and across the political spectrum, and from within the 'centralist' parties, irrespective of whether they were in government or opposition. Will the Russian war against Ukraine increase support in Member States' national parliaments for further EU military integration? While we support the expectation that the war in Ukraine is expanding the envelope of the possible, policymakers should know that national parliamentarians have been predisposed to supporting crisis management for some time.

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02 **When opposition to CSDP operations occurs in national parliaments, it most often comes from parties on the outer edges of the political spectrum** (both left and right), who often seek to disassociate themselves from mainstream parties. If the weight of parties at a distance from the political center increases, more opposition might ensue. Better communication of long-term benefits and of obligations to promote peace can address some reasons for opposition, but other reasons are strategically motivated and thus difficult to address.

Public records from across the national parliaments of EU Member States between 2016 and 2021 show a high degree of acceptance of CSDP crisis missions, especially around the centre of the political spectrum. Opposition does exist and often comes from parties located on the left and right fringes of the spectrum seeking to disassociate themselves from mainstream parties. The four most common reasons for opposition are: (1) disagreement with the purpose of the mission; (2) institutional implications; (3) national interests; and (4) political ideology. Outreach and communication can address some forms of opposition, while others are strategically motivated and likely to remain. In a number of countries, socialisation effects of belonging to government coalitions were observed; however, it is too early to say whether this is a reliable trend.

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03

There is broad and steady acceptability among the public for EU efforts in defence and security. It is a simplification, and often even outright wrong, to blame popular opinion for lack of progress in European defence integration.

Eurobarometer data and a big data study on news media show widespread acceptability among the public for EU security and defence. Across all Member States except Malta, news reports on security have a more positive tone when they include mentions of the EU. In Denmark, public opinion – as measured both through Eurobarometer data and through news media – was markedly positive towards EU security and defence efforts prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The June 2022 referendum abolishing the Danish CSDP opt-out thus corrected a misalignment between popular preferences and policy towards EU defence integration. Attention to practical details of EU defence and security operations and policies (e.g. reform (proposals) in CSDP, or CSDP mission launches) is however low.

Average news volume across EU (bold line) and per country (light lines) per 1000 inhabitants.

Average volume (per 1000 inhabitants) of security news in general and security news mentioning the EU, before and after the invasion (the thicker line is the EU median, thinner lines are volume per MS). News volumes clearly increase just prior to and after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

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04

Russia's invasion of Ukraine is a watershed moment for public perceptions of EU security and defence, but rather than overturning the existing trends of broad acceptability, the invasion has accelerated them. In Finland and Sweden, the public seemingly does not see a contradiction between NATO membership and support for participation in CSDP.

News media and opinion poll data indicate enhanced acceptability of EU action in security and defence post-invasion. The tone of news on security plummeted after the invasion – however, when the EU is mentioned in these news items, the tone drops less. Differences can be observed among Member States: Poland stands out, with mentions of the EU improving the tone of news on security matters greatly. The positive EU effect is also more pronounced in Sweden, Finland, and Russia-bordering states more broadly. For Sweden and Finland, both big data-based media analysis and Eurobarometer polling suggest that their recent NATO applications are not perceived as substitutes for CSDP or as undermining the role the EU plays or should play in security and defence.

02 | TAKEAWAYS ON STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT

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01

The formulation of an EU-wide strategy for external action can build on convergence among Member States in assessing the overall geopolitical environment and identifying certain broad security trends and challenges that have recently grown in importance. However, there are also **clear divergences between Member States when it comes to particular concerns**, which are linked to countries' size, geographical location, long-term and recent history, and current political context.

An analysis of strategic documents of Member States such as national security strategies and foreign policy strategies shows that Member States largely converge in their assessment of the broad security challenges that have grown in importance in recent years. Thus, there is convergence among Member States on the importance of the increasing strategic competition between the US and China, and on drivers of change such as climate change and cybersecurity, for example. At the same time, there is significant variation in Member States' strategic thinking on particular concerns that are linked to the countries' geographical position, issues in their vicinity, and political context. An EU-wide security strategy should build on the areas where security assessments and priorities converge, while remaining sensitive to particular concerns linked to Member States' geographical location and size.

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Global governance has diversified and traditional international organisations are increasingly complemented by informal structures without clear hierarchy. The EU must find ways to engage with both in order to realise its foreign and security policy objectives.

A study of the global governance of eight issue areas with relevance for security, defence and intelligence in EU foreign policy – trade, migration, climate change, space, artificial intelligence, health, energy and cybersecurity – revealed a shifting and relatively diminished role of traditional, formal intergovernmental organisations (IOs) in recent years, with global governance overall becoming more diverse. Present-day global governance comprises a wide range of intergovernmental and private transnational actors. They work through different channels, formal and informal, often without a clear hierarchy. As a result, international law-making efforts have become more informal and the probabilities of overlap and conflict have increased. The EU should adapt its participation modes in light of these different channels of global governance, and particularly the growing trend of informalisation, to avoid fragmentation of its efforts and improve effectiveness.

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With global governance increasingly taking place in formats beside or alongside traditional international organisations, the EU faces opportunities and obstacles. Informal institutions (e.g. international contact groups, or the G7) theoretically lower the participation threshold for the EU. Yet the EU's treaty basis and resulting processes and policies remain focused on traditional international organisations. While reforming existing IOs and making them more inclusive remains important, increasing engagement with informal institutions should also be a priority.

The shift in global governance whereby cooperation in traditional formal IOs (e.g. WTO, UNFCCC) is complemented by work in more informal configurations (e.g. international contact groups working on conflicts, public-private partnerships, the G7) presents the EU with opportunities and challenges as a public actor without exclusive competence in most matters of security. Informal institutions in principle lower the legal and political barriers to full participation by the EU. However, the focus in the EU's treaty basis and resulting processes and policies is still on a select number of traditional IOs. Overall, the EU-Member State division of competences will be key in determining the extent and effectiveness of the EU's engagement with global governance institutions. Beyond the focus on reforming its traditional IO partners to accommodate more diverse participation, the EU should also increasingly, and more directly, engage with informal institutions.

03 TAKEAWAYS ON THE LEGAL BASE, GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AND DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES OF THE EU'S EXTERNAL ACTION

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01 **Competences for the EU's external actions are still scattered in the treaties. This has presented significant challenges for policymakers. The EU should unify its fragmented legal bases for external action to reduce internal debates and improve effectiveness of decision-making.**

The EU needs to address the different legal bases for external action. In particular, the EU's external actions are still fragmented and competences are scattered throughout the two Treaties (the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)). This creates challenges for policymakers because, while the resulting uncertainties over the correct legal basis continue to be of constitutional significance, efficient policymaking is faced with internal debates (between the EU and its Member States and/or among the EU institutions) that can delay much-needed EU actions to tackle external crises.

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02 **Sectoral policies such as competition, health and environment can have significant external dimensions and can therefore contribute to or hamper progress towards CFSP objectives – yet they are not mentioned in Part Five of the TFEU on External Action. In this sense, Part Five of the TFEU should also refer to the external dimension of internal policies.**

While traditional foreign and security policy issues will continue to exist, some of the current external challenges can only be tackled effectively if the EU uses its "external" but also "internal" competences in a comprehensive manner (e.g. the external dimensions of competition policy and health policy have increased as a result of globalisation and the COVID-19 pandemic, respectively). Therefore, in addition to the consolidation of external objectives, for instance, in Article 21(2) of the TEU, it makes sense to also clearly link the internal and external dimensions of EU policies such as competition, health and environment – for instance by referring to this in Part Five of the TFEU.

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Council presidencies should build trust and regular discussion moments on the push for qualified majority voting (QMV) in CFSP – in the meantime, use alternatives such as the enabling or passarelle clauses to enhance promptness and adequacy of EU external action.

Interview and survey responses of national policymaking elites after the Russian invasion in Ukraine point to a window of opportunity to open a regular discussion in the Council on moving towards QMV in CFSP matters. Currently there is a sense of ambiguity, which can open the door for possible alternative options by enacting the already existing enabling or passarelle clauses. Notably a set of smaller Member States, but not all, continue to express rather strong opposition and have used their veto power in the past several years (e.g. Cyprus, Hungary). Nevertheless, the shock of the Russian war in Ukraine has acted as a trigger for a renewed discussion that, if fostered, has the potential to build necessary trust and increase the acceptability towards QMV in CFSP across EU capitals.

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Member States are re-evaluating all available defence and security tools following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In this context, some immediate first steps include increasing the use of PESCO and clarifying the interpretation and operationalisation of coalitions of the willing (Art. 44), solidarity (Art. 222) and military assistance (Art. 42).

Amid a real security threat to the EU, governments have become more accepting of the Union's defence and security mechanisms, looking for more coherent and effective CSDP action. Interviews and surveys with national policymakers recorded resounding support for increased use of PESCO across capitals. Simultaneously, the use of coalitions of the willing and the solidarity and mutual assistance clauses also find reasonable acceptability among national policymaking elites. Their future application, however, seems to be precluded by a lack of clarity on interpretation and operationalisation processes, and by the cumbersome procedures to enact some of the mechanisms. For EU institutions and the European External Action Service (EEAS), it is worth using the present momentum to help Member States in their pursuit for new options by agreeing on common interpretations and practical operationalisation steps.

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National policymakers show no appetite for treaty changes or yielding more powers to the European Parliament or Commission in CFSP/CSDP. In this context, increasing coherence between the Council, Commission and Parliament, drawing from the available legal frameworks, is one practical step towards enhancing EU external action.

While national policymaking elites do not express high acceptability towards treaty changes, including granting more powers to the European Commission and Parliament in CFSP/CSDP, some sort of institutional realignment does resonate with them. For example, policymaking elites from Estonia, Finland, Poland and Greece highlight the need for reform in the functioning of the EEAS (including its geographical balance), clarification of the roles and mandates of the HR/VP and stronger cooperation between the EEAS and the Commission. Some interviewed elites foresee a bigger role for the European Parliament in strategy development, some oversight roles, and fostering closer cooperation with Member States. Practical reinvention of the cooperation mechanisms between the Council, Commission and Parliament can enhance horizontal coherence in and the effectiveness of the EU's external action.

04 | TAKEAWAYS ON TOOLS, POLICIES AND STRATEGIES FOR THE EU'S EXTERNAL ACTION

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01 **Assessment criteria for defence cooperation in the EU framework and among EU Member States outside the EU framework should include both ex-ante and ex-post evaluation tools. Ex-post criteria should also focus on evaluating the external projection of EU.**

The sheer number of cooperative frameworks among Member States suggests there is a perceived need for more cooperation in defence. Against this background, the EU is taking on more responsibilities in defence, but this policy arena remains fragmented at the EU level. Comprehensive ex-ante and ex-post evaluation could help identify the strengths and weaknesses of defence cooperation, with the ultimate goal of improving results and the attractiveness of a common approach by identifying and implementing lessons learned. Furthermore, when non-EU countries are involved in, or are main beneficiaries of, defence cooperation, assessments should consider the impact the cooperation has on the external projection of the EU and the capacity of the EU to engage with international partners.

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02 **Mutual trust is needed to further improve intelligence cooperation in the EU. This could be achieved by creating new dialogues or information-sharing arrangements between European policymakers, experts, researchers and early career diplomats.**

While sharing knowledge is the first step towards harmonising views, information in the EU is fragmented because Member States may not be willing to share all information at their disposal. The depth and breadth of information exchanges depends on the existence of common threat perceptions and common interests. One way to increase a common understanding of external threats is to create entities where intelligence experts can come together to share views and expertise, thus contributing to developing a European strategic culture. This could take the form of a platform for reflection, engagement and outreach. A good example is the Intelligence College in Europe, created in 2019, which brings together intelligence officers and security experts who exchange good practices and ideas to enhance a common intelligence culture and to improve joint situational awareness.

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03 **The EU needs to continue to develop its security measures regarding the internal handling of sensitive information to create an environment where mutual trust between the Member States could improve further.**

Concerns about how intelligence is treated is among the top reasons why EU Member States do not share enough information. The members of any intelligence community need to guarantee that information is secure, including through internal security measures to safeguard methods and sources and prevent information from ending up in the hands of hostile countries. One way to increase mutual trust in the EU is to further secure communication channels where information cannot be leaked in relation to third parties. The more EU Member States are convinced of effective internal security handling, the more they would be willing to share quite a bit of private information.

04

Further attention should be dedicated to improving coordination and ensuring coherence among all policy areas and organs in the EU's external action. The Integrated Approach could be utilised as a template and redesigned to move beyond its current focus on external conflict and crises, towards a broader focus on how the EU coordinates all of its policies with external effects (including CSDP/CFSP, but also trade, development, climate and health policies, for example).

The EU already has a considerable toolbox for its external action, including instruments and resources across different policy areas. Coherence among them is crucial to achieving external action objectives. The EU has highlighted the importance of linking policies through, for example, its 2013 Comprehensive Approach – which set steps to combine instruments, tools and policies of EU external action to respond to conflict and crises – as well as the more recent 2018 Integrated Approach. The Integrated Approach could be a basis for a redesigned and revitalised policy approach that guides an operational discussion of how the EU coordinates its full range of policies with external effects – beyond responses to external conflicts and crises alone. The EEAS could take a significant role in advancing this coordination.

05

The EU needs a clearer and more coherent definition of strategic partnerships that includes a more consistent identification of who the strategic partners are, what the partnerships entail, and how they work legally and practically.

There is no official EU document that formally defines the EU's criteria for strategic partnerships. Although the EU's strategic documents, including the 2016 Global Strategy and the 2022 Strategic Compass, identify the EU's strategic partners along with relevant cooperation areas, a great deal of variation and incongruity was observed in a study of key documents. The EU thus lacks a clear and unanimous definition of what a strategic partnership is, what it entails, and how it works in theory and in practice at both the legal and political level. Given this conceptual ambiguity, the strategic partnership label is used in multiple ways by all EU institutions for different countries, international organisations, and regional groupings. A clearer definition will set the basis for a more coherent, efficient, and sustainable CFSP and CSDP.

06

The EU needs more formalised channels of communication, a higher level of institutionalisation, and greater issue area coverage with strategic partners in order to achieve more concrete results from strategic partnerships for its CFSP and CSDP.

A tendency to increase formalisation of the EU's strategic partnerships is observed in the last couple of years, where specific written agreements are signed following the joint statements, but there is still great variation across the EU's individual strategic partnerships. Nevertheless, the EU's strategic partnerships are more likely to deliver concrete results for CFSP and CSDP when they are more densely institutionalised through formal agreements and when they cover a larger and diversified set of cooperation areas. Legally and practically, this could be done by increasing the breadth of the policy areas strategic partners agree to cooperate on, as well as the depth of the agreements in institutional terms, including the degree of codification, the frequency of interaction, and the envisaged formats for cooperation.

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07

With regard to the European Neighbourhood Policy, the EU should ensure greater coherence between its discourse in its official documents and de facto practices of external action.

Ever since the ENP emerged in 2003/2004, the EU has created and used various framings in its discourse related to the policy, mainly with a view to legitimating the existence of the ENP and ENP-related actions. Over the years, certain framings prevailed over others and securitisation trends negatively affected dominant EU discourses and narratives. Meanwhile, the gap between the discourse used in EU official documents and the EU's external action vis-à-vis the neighbourhood widened significantly. As salient framings pursued by the EU in the ENP context were thus not backed up by corresponding policies, the ENP underperformed in terms of effectiveness, rendering its credibility and even legitimacy questionable.

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08

It is important to improve coherence across EU policies in all phases of conflict, from prevention to mediation and resolution, and continuously coordinate with non-EU partners in all conflict management interventions and strategies.

In the cycle of conflict management, actions in prevention, mediation and resolution are overlapping and complementary. International actors have converged on a comprehensive conceptual approach that recognises the importance of preventive and responsive actions in the wide range of issue areas that make up the broad human security concept. Therefore, the EU's policies should be coherent and joined-up not only in general and across the EU institutions implementing them, but also across conflict phases. Conflict management interventions have become increasingly complex as a result of the ambitious comprehensive approach, meaning that coordination and close partnerships with non-EU institutions and state actors before, during and after conflict intervention are ever more important.

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09

EU institutions should enhance and make full use of early warning systems (EWS) in their responses to conflicts and potential conflict situations. In addition, EU Member States and EU institutions should coordinate to exchange information from their respective EWS and foresight mechanisms.

Research on conflict prevention, mediation and resolution reveals the ever-growing importance of anticipation and fast response to potential conflictual situations. Early warning systems (EWS) are crucial mechanisms to anticipate crises and conflicts and inform a joined-up EU response. As such, the use of EWS and foresight should be further embedded in the range of EU institutions and policies engaging in conflict prevention, mediation and resolution. Moreover, EU Member States should coordinate in their EWS and foresight with the EU institutions to gather and analyse information and streamline it into strategy and action.

RESEARCH PARAMETERS

1. About ENGAGE

The ENGAGE (Envisioning a New Governance Architecture for a Global Europe) project examines how the EU – both the institutions and its Member States – can effectively and sustainably harness all of its tools in joined-up external action alongside the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) to meet key strategic challenges and become a stronger global actor.

ENGAGE identifies key challenges the EU's external action faces, from the rise of nationalism, the contestation of multilateralism, climate change and conflicts in the EU's neighbourhood to the acceptability of EU external action from the perspective of citizens and national decisionmakers. With these challenges in mind, the project assesses existing governance structures, treaties and strategic objectives – engaging with strategic partners, neighbouring regions, and conflict scenarios – to provide policymakers with concrete recommendations and tools. The work of the project will ultimately lead to a White Paper for Joined-Up, Coherent, Sustainable and Effective External Action, to inspire an inclusive and representative EU-wide conversation.

2. Project objectives

The overall objective of ENGAGE is to provide policymakers with a toolbox to improve the capacities and capabilities of EU external action. In order to do so, ENGAGE pursues five general objectives:

1. To analyse the most pressing contextual challenges faced by the EU's external action, including challenges emerging from the state of global governance and international relations, as well as those emerging from the acceptability of EU external action among EU citizens and Member States.

2. To assess existing governance structures and policy processes related to the multiple domains of the EU's external action.

3. To examine ways in which the EU can more effectively achieve its strategic goals, including successful engagement with strategic partners, neighbouring regions, and conflict and crisis scenarios.

4. To formulate recommendations on how to accommodate the multiple action domains, including traditionally internal policy areas, in a joined-up, coherent, sustainable and effective external action.

5. To inform policymakers on the governance structures needed to ensure a joined-up and EU diplomatic action and international cooperation.

3. Methodology

ENGAGE uses a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods along with a comprehensive review of state-of-the-art literature and in-depth case studies. This includes theoretically analysing and developing key concepts and criteria; mapping and analysing the legal and institutional basis of EU external action from an interdisciplinary angle; conducting in-depth case studies and semi-structured interviews; and engaging in document analysis, big data mining and advanced sentiment analysis. Further, ENGAGE takes a dual gender-sensitive research approach, reflected in the composition and internal mechanisms of the consortium, and in the research content.

Project identity:

- **Project name:** ENGAGE (Envisioning a New Governance Architecture for a Global Europe)

- **Coordinator:** Fundación Esade (Spain)

- **Consortium:** Carnegie Europe Foundation (Belgium); College of Europe, Natolin (Poland); GLOBSEC (Slovakia); Fundación Esade (Spain); Hertie School (Germany); Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals (Spain); Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (France); International Institute for Strategic Studies (Germany and United Kingdom); Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (Belgium); Rijksuniversiteit Groningen (The Netherlands); Sabanci University

(Turkey); Tampere University (Finland); and The University of Edinburgh (United Kingdom)

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